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Abstract
For those concerned with the long-term value of their accounts, it can be a chal-
lenge to plan in the present for inflation-adjusted economic growth over coming
decades. Here, I argue that there exists an economic constant that carries through
time, and that this can help us to anticipate the more distant future: global eco-
nomic wealth has a fixed link to civilization’s overall rate of energy consumption
from all sources; the ratio of these two quantities has not changed over the past
40 years that statistics are available. Power production and wealth rise equally
quickly because civilization, like any other system in the universe, must consume
and dissipate its energy reserves in order to sustain its current size. One perspective
might be that financial wealth must ultimately collapse as we deplete our energy
reserves. However, we can also expect that highly aggregated quantities like global
wealth have inertia, and that growth rates must persist. Exceptionally rapid inno-
vation in the two decades following 1950 allowed for unprecedented acceleration
of inflation-adjusted rates of return. But today, real innovation rates are more stag-
nant. This means that, over the coming decade or so, global GDP and wealth
should rise fairly steadily at an inflation-adjusted rate of about 2.2% per year.
1 Introduction
Our financial accounts seem to change unpredictably according to the actions of indi-
viduals, organizations and governments. Because the range of human behavior can be
so diverse and out of our control, it seems that there is an exceptionally broad range of
future societal outcomes. Anticipating long-term economic conditions anything more
than a year away seems daunting at best.
Forecasting future human behavior becomes relevant where the goal is to provide
society with forecasts of climate change. Through the combustion of fossil fuels, our
economic activities have been slowly increasing atmospheric greenhouse gas concen-
trations. Consequent changes in climate patterns remain modest. But, perhaps several
decades from now, global warming will become an important drag on economic growth
(IPCC, 2007).
For those concerned with their personal financial accounts, the issue is more about
anticipating inflation-adjusted rates of return, sometimes as much as a decade or more
ahead. While, diversification can help financial portfolios to weather short-term fluc-
tuations in market valuations, the optimal strategy for the longer term is less clear. For
example, regardless of investment strategy, Baby Boomers have generally prospered
from a rising economic tide that has lifted most boats over the past half-century. Yet
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Figure 1: Since 1970, global wealth as defined by Eq. 2 (blue), global power produc-
tion (red), and the ratio of power to wealth (black). Wealth is referenced to 100 in
1970. Power production is derived from all possible sources, including fossil, nuclear,
biomass, and renewables.
many worry that such extraordinary overall gains cannot persist indefinitely. All tides
subside. Broad economic gains can be lost.
Are we confined to hoping for the best but preparing for the worst? Or can we
at least plan ahead for the future by making constrained predictions for where our net
worth and rates of energy consumption are headed? In a recent paper focused on the
implications for climate change, I proposed that we can, provided that we are willing
to take a broader view by considering slow changes in the economy as a global whole
(Garrett, 2011a).
2 A link between economics and physics
Physical reasoning suggests that a very broad measure of civilizations total fiscal wealth
should have a fixed link to its overall rate of primary energy consumption, or power
production, independent of time. Observations seem to support this hypothesis to a
remarkable degree (Figure 1). The implication is that global wealth will continue to
rise for as long as power production can continue to grow. Otherwise, if resources ever
become so constrained that the capacity to consume energy falls, global wealth must
enter a phase of collapse.
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Before elaborating further on this new economic growth model, it is worth exam-
ining traditional macro-economic models that focus on human labor and creativity as
the motive economic forces. Almost all economists treat “human” capital, or labor,
and “physical” capital as two totally distinct quantities. Labor and capital combine in
a complex way to enable economic production. A small part of economic production
is a savings that can be carried into the future as added physical capital. But most pro-
duction is siphoned away by people through their consumption of such things as food
and entertainment. Once something is consumed, it has no potential to influence future
economic activities.
While this model is certainly logical, from the standpoint of physics, it seems
strange because it appears to both ignore and violate the most universal of laws: the
Second Law of Thermodynamics. The Second Law is familiar to many for its state-
ments about entropy production. Perhaps the best known is that the universe, taken as
a whole, inescapably slides towards increasing disorder.
But the Second Law also demands that nothing can do anything without consum-
ing concentrated energy, or fuel, and then dissipating it as unusable waste heat. For
example, the Earth “consumes” concentrated sunlight to power weather and the water
cycle, and then radiates diffuse, unusable thermal energy to the cold of space.
Like the weather in our atmosphere, all economic actions and motions, even our
thoughts, must also be propelled by a progression from concentrated fuel to useless
waste heat. The economy would grind to a halt absent continued energetic input. Ma-
chines slow down; buildings crumble; people die; technology becomes obsolete; we
forget. Civilization must constantly consume in order to sustain itself against this con-
stant loss of energy and matter.
Even we as individuals consume the energy in food at an average rate of about 100
Watts. This sustains and builds the joint activities of our brain, heart, lungs, and other
body functions. We must keep eating to regenerate dead cells and offset the constant
loss of heat through our skin.
Taken as a whole, civilization is no different, except that after centuries of growth,
it is rather large and wealthy. Today, sustaining all of our activities requires continuous
consumption and dissipation of about 17 trillion Watts of power, or the equivalent of
17,000 one Gigawatt power plants. We burn fossil fuels, split uranium nuclei and tap
the potential energy in rivers, sunlight and wind. About 4% of this energy is dissipated
by our 7 billion bodies. The rest powers our agriculture, buildings and machines. Once
consumed, all energy is ultimately dissipated as waste heat. If energy consumption ever
ceased, our machines would stop, and we would all die. Certainly, economic wealth
would be zero.
3 Treating the economy as a global whole
The idea that the economy is sustained by power production has certainly been dis-
cussed by others (Ayres and Warr, 2009). However, there is a particularly beautiful
corollary of the Second Law whose implications for the economy have largely been
missed in these treatments. This is the statement that nothing can be isolated: all of
space and time are linked. Nothing happens spontaneously, and all actions from the
3
past have some influence on the present and future. Equally, no sub-component of the
universe can be completely separated from interactions with any part of the rest. How-
ever, remote or slow the interactions may be, all parts are connected to and interact
with all others.
What this means for how we model societal behavior is perhaps best expressed
by the Elizabethan poet John Donne, “No man is an island, entire of itself. Each is
a piece of the continent, a part of the main.” Through international communications
and trade, ourselves, our ideas, education and relationships all form a vibrantly inter-
acting and changing whole that is completely integrated with our transportation routes,
communication networks, factories, buildings and databases.
In other words, all elements of civilization work together. No matter how distant,
no element of economic production can be isolated from any other. We are all part of a
vibrant organism we call the global economy.
So where traditional economic models allow a portion of real production to sim-
ply disappear to the past due in the form of “consumption”, the Second Law would
suggest that this is impossible. For one, humans are not isolated, but instead inextri-
cably linked to the rest of the organism’s overall structure. Human consumption is not
cleanly separable from energy dissipation by anything else. For another, past actions
are carried forward to the present and future. Civilization’s history of consumption has
sustained it against dissipation and decay, and nurtured it forward such that it is able
to continue to consume in the present. For example, Ancient Greece sustained an ar-
chitectural tradition that has been carried forward to current designs. Or, entertainment
consumed a hundred years ago sustains a cultural tradition that influences our choices
today. Our ancestors could not have procreated to enable our own existence if they had
not consumed and dissipated the energy in food.
4 A new model for economic growth
In an economic growth model, the above arguments are simply expressed by a hypoth-
esis that “Wealth is Power”. We are sustained by a consumption of energy. A portion
of inflation-adjusted economic output cannot disappear. Rather all of production is re-
turned to wealth, where wealth is defined very generally as human and physical capital
combined.
Unlike traditional economic treatments, real production can neither be siphoned off
to consumption by humans alone, nor to the past. It has nowhere else to go but to “pro-
duce”. Put another way, wealth is the accumulation of all past production, adjusting for
inflation. The current inflation-adjusted global GDP is like a “rate of return” on global
wealth since, like returns in a bank account, it adds to whatever wealth currently exists.
The tie to physics is the hypothesis that this accumulated wealth is directly propor-
tional to civilization’s total capacity to consume energy or produce power. And just
as we gain weight when we eat too much, only when energy consumption exceeds
dissipation can a convergence of flows allow for civilization expansion and a positive
inflation-adjusted economic output or GDP (see Appendix for the mathematical de-
tails).
Crucially, this hypothesis is falsifiable. In other words, it is sufficiently simple,
4
transparent and easy to test, that it could potentially be discarded based on observa-
tional evidence. I tested this hypothesis using statistics for world GDP and energy
consumption that are available for each year from 1970 onward, together with more
sparse estimates for world GDP that extend back to 1 AD (Garrett, 2011a).
What these data show is that, for each year between 1970 and 2009, the ratio of
current power production to our historical accumulation of wealth has barely deviated
from a constant 7.1 Watts per thousand inflation-adjusted 2005 US dollars (Figure 1 and
Table 1). The standard deviation has been only 3% during a period when global power
production and wealth have increased by 120% and world GDP has risen 230%. Wealth
and power production are not merely correlated, any more than photon frequency and
energy are correlated in the formula E = hν . Rather, like frequency and energy, the
ratio of the two appears to be fixed.
It seems extraordinary, but the implication is that we can begin to think of seem-
ingly complex human systems as simple physical systems. Our collective fiscal wealth
is an alternative and very human measure of our capacity to power our society through
the consumption of fuel. Our total assets, including ourselves, our relationships and
our knowledge, are inseparable from our collective capacity to consume our primary
reserves of coal, oil, natural gas, nuclear fuels and renewables. Both will rise and fall
together.
Table 1: For select years since 1970, measured values for the global power production (trillion
Watts), global real wealth (trillion 2005 MER USD), the ratio of power production to wealth
(Watts per thousand 2005 MER USD), global real GDP (trillion 2005 MER USD per year) and
the rate of return on wealth defined by GDP/Wealth (% per year).
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2009
Power production (TW) 7.2 8.3 9.6 10.2 11.6 12.1 13.1 15.2 16.1
Power/Wealth 6.4 6.9 7.3 7.2 7.5 7.1 6.9 7.2 7.0
GDP (Trillion $/year) 15.3 18.4 22.2 25.3 30.2 33.5 39.7 45.7 49.1
Rate of return (%/year) 1.37 1.53 1.70 1.78 1.94 1.96 2.10 2.18 2.14
.
5 Precision versus predictability in economic forecasts
For those concerned with climate change or the long-term value of their financial ac-
counts, a link between economics and physics has some important implications. We
can anticipate inertia in global consumption and economic growth. Our current con-
sumption and wealth are inextricably tied to past production, but the past is unchange-
able. Absent some sort of severe external shock, near-term reductions in energy con-
sumption and wealth are implausible because they would somehow require civilization
to “forget” its past.
Assuming that economic consumption and growth will persist in the near term may
seem rather obvious to some. But what may be less well recognized is that there are
mathematical and physical constraints to growth. For those who study the evolution of
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physical systems, a term that is often used here is “reddening”. This is a convenient
way of expressing that it is the most slowly varying, low frequency and “red” (rather
than blue) components of past variability in a system that most strongly influence its
present behavior.
For example, seasonal temperature trends normally have a stronger influence on
daily high temperatures than shorter term weather variability. Or, 20 years of growth
through childhood and adolescence tends to have a greater influence on our daily food
consumption than how much we ate yesterday. Surprises can happen, of course. For
us, there is always the potential for accident or a disease. Still, the natural tendency for
growth is for it to be slow and steady.
Equally, the global economy’s current capacity to consume and grow has evolved
from thousands of years of human development, through the creation of subsequent
generations, as well as the construction of farms, towns, communication networks and
machines. While everything does slowly decay or die, the past can never be entirely
erased. Even our most distant ancestors have played a role in our current economic and
social well-being. By now, civilization has enjoyed a rather lengthy past, and we can
count on this accumulated inertia to carry us into the future.
Certainly, it is still possible that countries will rise and fall, but globally aggre-
gated economic wealth should continue to enjoy recent inflation-adjusted rates of re-
turn. Even in 2009, during the depths of the Great Recession, 2.14% was added to total
real global wealth (Table 1), only slightly down from the historical high of 2.26% in
2007. And we continue to grow our power production at similar rates. It is probably
a safe bet to assume that similarly high rates of return will persist over the coming
decade.
The main point is that persistence in trends is an effective tool for forecasting,
but most especially when applied to highly “reddened” variables like global wealth
and energy consumption that are aggregated over time and space. When predicting
the evolution of any system, there is always a trade-off. It is always easier to make
forecasts provided that we are willing to sacrifice temporal and spatial resolution.
Predicting the weather next week can be almost impossible. But forecasting north-
ern hemisphere average temperatures this coming winter is actually quite easy: history
is an excellent guide. Similarly, it is very difficult to predict a small companys stock
value next week; but extrapolating trends in globally-aggregated wealth can plausibly
be done for as much as a decade hence.
6 Innovation and increasing rates of return
To reiterate, available statistics show that wealth, when it is integrated over the entire
global economy, and integrated over the entire history of economic wealth production,
has been related to the current rate of global primary energy consumption through a
factor that has been effectively constant over nearly four decades of civilization growth.
The implication is that aggregated civilization wealth and consumption has inertia, and
therefore its current growth rate is unlikely to cease in a hurry.
Yet the global rate of return on wealth does change, even if slowly. Historical
statistics shown in Table 1 and Figure 2 indicate that, over the past century or so, there
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Figure 2: Adjusting for inflation, the time for global wealth’s rate of return to double
(calculated as a decadal running mean), versus the doubling time for wealth itself.
Select years are shown for reference.
has been a long term tendency for wealth to double over ever shorter intervals. In the
late 1800s, doubling global wealth would have taken about 200 years based on then–
current rates of return. Today this takes just 30 years. As a whole, the world is getting
richer faster.
I use the word innovation to describe this acceleration of inflation-adjusted rates
of return because it represents the capacity of civilization as a whole to beat mere
inertia. Adjusting for inflation is important here, because it is not always evident that
any investment in innovation will pay off. If investing in human creativity does not
lead to true innovation, then it is a waste of effort that could have otherwise contributed
to previously attained rates of growth. But, real innovations provide a jump in rates of
return that civilization can carry forward into the foreseeable future.
Globally, innovation has come in fits and starts. Figure 2 shows that innovation has
had two golden periods over the past two centuries. The first was during the Gilded
Age or “Belle Epoque” of the late 1800s and early 1900s, when resource expansion and
technological discoveries allowed the rate of return to double in just 40 years. Then
again, in the baby boom period between 1950 and 1970, the rate of return doubled in
the remarkably short timespan of just 20 years.
By contrast, both the 1930s and the past decade have been characterized by much
more gradual inflation-adjusted innovation rates. Even though wealth is now doubling
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more quickly than ever before in history, for the first time since the Great Depression
the rate of return is no longer increasing.
Why has the passage of history been characterized by economic “fronts” on global
scales, with rapid innovation giving ultimately giving way to stagnation?
Here again, physical principles can provide guidance. Given that inflation-adjusted
wealth and energy consumption appear to be linked through a constant, the identical
question is asking what enables energy consumption to accelerate.
Conservation laws from thermodynamics tell us that rates of innovation and growth
should be largely controlled by the balance between how fast civilization discovers new
energy reserves and how fast it depletes them (Garrett, 2012). For example, it is easy to
imagine that access to important new coal or oil reserves in the late 1800s and around
1950 allowed civilization to capitalize on human creativity in ways that were previously
impossible.
Today, we continue to discover new energy reserves, but perhaps not sufficiently
quickly. We are now very large and we are depleting our reserves at the most rapid rate
yet. Increased competition for resources may be constraining our capacity to turn our
creativity and knowledge into real innovation and accelerated global economic growth.
7 Conclusions
I have described here a constant that links a very general representation of the world’s
total economic wealth to civilization’s power production capacity. Because this con-
stant does not change with time, physical principles can be applied to estimate future
global-scale economic growth over the long-term without having to explicitly model
the exceptionally complex internal details of people and their lifestyles.
There have been criticisms of this approach, which have stated that “Economic
systems are not the same as physical systems, and we shouldn’t model them as if they
are” (Scher and Koomey, 2011). Yet, civilization is undeniably part of the physical
universe. It is difficult to imagine how we aren’t fundamentally constrained by physical
laws. At the very least, appealing to physics appears to make the job of economic
forecasting more transparent, simple and scientifically robust.
Here, I have made the argument that recent rates of return are most likely to persist
in such highly aggregated quantities as the global economy. We can make quite distant
estimates of future growth, but only if we are willing to sacrifice resolution. While this
does not specifically help us to predict trajectories for specific countries or economic
sectors, we might anticipate that slower than average rates of return in one nation or
sector should be balanced by faster growth elsewhere.
It must be kept in mind that exponential growth trends cannot continue unabated.
Wealth is tied to power production and therefore to resource consumption. Sooner or
later, civilization must face up to reserve depletion or environmental degradation.
But, for as long as these impacts remain manageable, we can anticipate that global
economic wealth, GDP, and energy consumption will continue to grow at recently ob-
served rates. The qualification is that rates of return are unlikely to rise as fast as they
did in the decades following the 1950s. Rather, for timescales significantly less than the
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wealth doubling time of 30 years – perhaps a decade – the forecasted inflation-adjusted
global rate of return should average a fairly steady 2.2% per year.
For those thinking even further ahead, inflation-adjusted rates of return should be
guided by whether there is net depletion or expansion of our primary energy reserves.
It might help to think of our energy reserves as the retirement account for civilization as
a whole. Discovering new energy reserves today expands our collective accounts. But
having sufficient reserves for the long-term requires that we not “spend down” what we
have discovered too quickly. What we consume today must also be balanced against
what we have left to consume in the future.
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Appendix: A physical model for economic growth
The model for long-term economic growth used here is based on a core hypothesis,
motivated by the Second Law of Thermodynamics, that energy consumption is required
to power economic activities, and that all elements of civilization must be considered
as part of a larger whole. No portion of production can disappear to the past as human
consumption, with no influence on the future (Garrett, 2011a).
Expressed mathematically, all economic production, once adjusted for inflation,
contributes to global wealth or capital, so that
dC
dt
= Y (1)
or, in integral form:
C =
∫ t
0
Y
(
t ′
)
dt ′ (2)
where C, the inflation-adjusted economic value (or civilization wealth) C is calculated
from the time-integral of global economic production (or GDP) Y , adjusted for inflation
at 2005 market exchange rates (MER), and aggregated over the entirety of civilization
history. While not described here, under this approach, the GDP deflator is related to
capital decay in traditional approaches (Garrett, 2011b).
Global economic wealth C is sustained by the instantaneous rate of primary energy
consumption by civilization a through a constant λ
a = λC (3)
Taking a to be in units of Watts (Joules per second), and Y in units of 2005 MER
US dollars per second, available statistics indicate that λ is indeed constant, with a
measured value of 7.1 Watts per 1000 dollars. The standard deviation over the past
forty years has been just 3%.
So, at least over the long-run, sustaining a fiscally measurable inflation-adjusted
world GDP requires a growing power production. From Equations 1 and 3, the produc-
tion function for the growth model is
Y =
1
λ
da
dt
(4)
Also, from Equation 3, global wealth C and energy consumption a must rise at the
same rate. This can be expressed in a variety of ways, all of which follow from Eqs. 1
to 4:
RateofReturn = η =
Y
C
=
1
C
dC
dt
=
1
a
da
dt
=
Y∫ t
0 Y(t′)dt′
(5)
While the rate of return η is tied to growth in power production, it is also an expres-
sion of the ratio current economic output to the time integral of past economic output,
adjusted for inflation.
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Productivity and GDP growth
Very often in economic studies, one sees the ratio f = Y/a, which is termed the “en-
ergy productivity” or “energy efficiency” of the economy since it represents how well
economies turn energy consumption a into economic production Y . Since a = λC and
η = Y/C, it follows that:
RateofReturn = η = λ f (6)
So, since λ is a constant, the rate of return on wealth is proportional to the economy’s
energy productivity, and only by increasing energy productivity can the rate of return
increase.
When the rate of return increases, this can be interpreted as a consequence of “real
innovation” since, from Eq. 6 it corresponds to greater energy productivity f . The
innovation rate is:
Innovationrate =
1
η
dη
dt
=
1
f
df
dt
(7)
If innovations improve energy productivity f , then they accelerate growth and lead to
higher rates of return on wealth. Curiously, from Eq. 3, they also lead to increasing
power production a.
The possibility that energy efficiency gains might “backfire” has been hotly dis-
puted, and it is contrary to what is normally assumed (see also Saunders (2000); Poli-
meni et al. (2007); Owen (2010)). Indeed, it does seem quite counter-intuitive that
improving energy efficiency leads to more rather than less power production. But, the
system must be considered as a whole. Innovation allows civilization to collectively
expand at a more rapid pace into the energy resources that sustain it, and this allows it
to produce more power.
Perhaps the most commonly quoted macro-economic statistic is the real GDP growth
rate. In the framework here, this can be expressed very simply as the sum of the current
rate of return, and the innovation rate or acceleration of the rate of return
1
Y
dY
dt
= rateof return + innovation = η+
dlnη
dt
≡ λ f+ dlnf
dt
(8)
In fact, since the current productivity arises from past innovations (i.e, f =
∫ t
0 d f/dt
′dt ′),
the history of innovation is the sole motivating force driving current GDP growth.
To illustrate, the mean energy productivity f = Y/a between 1970 and 2009 was
83 dollars per megajoule, where dollars are expressed in inflation-adjusted 2005 MER
units. The mean value for the rate of return for energy consumption and wealth, η =
λ f , over this period was 1.87 percent per year. On top of this mean was the trend
in η , which increased from 1.37 percent per year in 1970 to 2.14 percent per year
in 2009. So, the fitted innovation rate for this time period was d lnη/dt = 0.93 %
yr−1. This implies an average real GDP growth rate for the period of d lnY/dt =
1.87 + 0.93= 2.80 % per year. The actual observed mean was 2.93% per year, a
difference off just 0.13% per year. Thus, accurate forecasts of global GDP growth
can be inferred knowing only how fast energy productivity is improving, and without
having to explicitly represent nations, sectors, people or their lifestyles.
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Long-term forecasting of wealth
If real innovation is positive, then from Eq. 5 and Eq. 6, the deterministic solution for
the growth of wealth C is
C (t) =C0e
ητη
(
et/τη−1
)
(9)
C0 is todays wealth, and τη represents the characteristic innovation time
τη =
1
innovationrate
=
1
d lnη/dt
(10)
Note that the solution for C (t) condenses to the simple exponential growth form of
C = C0 expηt in the limit that the innovation rate slows to zero and τη → ∞. If there
is positive innovation, however, then τη is positive and finite, and wealth growth is
explosive or super-exponential (i.e. the exponent of an exponent) Garrett (2012).
While more mathematically cumbersome, a familiar way of expressing growth is
in terms of doubling-times. The doubling times δ for wealth C, and the rate of return
η , are given respectively by δC = ln2/η and δη = τη ln2.
Effectively δC represents the time it takes for civilization to double its wealth, as-
suming current rates of return hold. Similarly, δη is the time required for the rate of
return to double (or δC to halve), assuming current innovation rates stay fixed. The
recent history for these quantities is shown in Figure 2. From Eq. 9, a deterministic
solution for the evolution of wealth is
C (t) =C02
δη
δC
(
2t/δη−1
)
(11)
12
References
Ayres, R. U. and Warr, B.: The economic growth engine, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham,
UK, 2009.
Garrett, T. J.: Are there basic physical constraints on future anthropogenic emissions
of carbon dioxide?, Clim. Change, 3, 437–455, doi:10.1007/s10584-009-9717-9,
2011a.
Garrett, T. J.: No way out? The double-bind in seeking global prosperity alongside
mitigated climate change, Earth Sys. Dynam., 3, 1–17, doi:10.5194/esd-3-1-2012,
2011b.
Garrett, T. J.: Modes of growth in dynamic systems, Proc. Roy. Soc. A, doi:10.1098/
rspa.2012.0039, 2012.
IPCC: Climate Change 2007 - Impacts, Adaption and Vulnerability, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2007.
Owen, D.: The efficiency dilemma, The New Yorker, pp. 78–85, 2010.
Polimeni, J. M., Giampietro, M., and Alcott, B.: The Jevons Paradox and the Myth of
Resource Efficiency Improvement, Routledge, 2007.
Saunders, H. D.: A view from the macro side: rebound, backfire, and Khazzoom-
Brookes, Energy Policy, 28, 439–449, 2000.
Scher, I. and Koomey, J.: Is accurate forecasting of economic systems possible? An ed-
itorial comment, Clim. Change, 3, 473–479, doi:0.1007/s10584-010-9945-z, 2011.
13
